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China’s long insistence on non-interference and sovereignty and frequent criticism of Western in-
terventionism has contributed to a widely held impression that China lends and invests abroad 
without attaching policy conditions. This discussion paper surveys the general policy debate on 
conditionality in lending, as well as China’s own debate on conditionality. We then examine bila-
teral loans provided by Chinese state-owned policy banks, notably China Exim Bank, arguing that 
the assumption of China’s shunning conditionality is valid only if the term is taken narrowly to 
imply the specific set of policy conditions (e.g. privatisation and financial liberalisation) routinely 
called for by World Bank Group lenders. Based on a literature review and analysis of loan features 
along with tentative evidence from empirical cases of Chinese bilateral lending, we identify four 
hypothetical types of conditionality: political conditionality, embedded conditionality, cross-
conditionality and emergent conditionality. In all likelihood the last three types of conditionality are 
not imposed by a unitary state actor, but emerge as an indirect consequence of the voluminous busi-
ness activities of Chinese state-linked lenders and enterprises in developing countries. 
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Yleisesti oletetaan, että koska Kiina on pitkään pitänyt kiinni puuttumattomuus- ja suverentiteettipe-
riaatteista ja usein kritisoi Lännen interventionismia, Kiina myös lainaa ja sijoittaa ulkomaille ilman 
politiikkaehtoja. Tämä keskustelupaperi tarkastelee yleistä keskustelua lainojen ehdollistamisesta, 
sekä Kiinan sisällä käytyä ehdollistamiskeskustelua. Seuraavaksi tarkastelemme Kiinan valtio-
omisteisten politiikkapankkien (policy banks) bilateraalisia lainoja, erityisesti Exim-pankin osalta. 
Keskustelupaperin argumentti on, että Kiinan oletettu vastahakoisuus ehdollistamista vastaan pätee 
lähinnä jos tämän käsitteen ymmärretään tarkoittavan niitä nimenomaisia politiikkaehtoja, joita 
Maailmanpankkiryhmän lainausinstituutiot tavanomaisesti ovat edellyttäneet, kuten yksityistämistä 
tai rahoitusmarkkinoiden avaamista. Kirjallisuuskatsauksen sekä lainojen piirteiden ja alustavien 
Kiinan bilateraalilainoituksen empiiristen tapausten analyysien pohjalta, identifioimme neljä hypo-
teettista ehdollistamisen muotoa: poliittinen ehdollistaminen, upotettu ehdollistaminen, ristikkäinen 
ehdollistaminen sekä emergentti ehdollistaminen. Nämä ehdollistamisen muodot eivät, ensimmäistä 
lukuunottamatta, todennäköisesti ole yhtenäisen valtiotoimijan asettamia. Sen sijaan ne ilmaantuvat 
kiinalaisten valtiollisten lainaajien ja valtionyhtiöiden merkittävien kehitysmaapanostusten epäsuo-
rana seurauksena.  
 
JEL codes: F34, F36, F59 
Asiasanat: Kiina, ulkomainen lainananto, ehdollisuus, politiikkapankit 
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1  Introduction  
 
China’s long insistence on non-interference and sovereignty and frequent criticism of Western in-
terventionism has created a widely held impression that China lends and invests abroad without at-
taching policy conditions. Under this view, Chinese financing institutions, unlike Western govern-
ments or Western-controlled institutions, grant loans without requiring the recipient government 
adhere to certain political standards (e.g. governance) or adjust their economic policies (Bosshard, 
2007; 刁 and 何, 2008: 125-126;  Foster et al., 2008: 6; 周, 2008; Chin and Helleiner, 2008: 90; 
Farnsworth, 2011: 60; Bräutigam, 2010: 37, 39-40; Dennison and Dworkin, 2010: 2).  
Indeed, respect for state sovereignty and non-interference have been guiding principles of 
Chinese foreign policy for decades. Premier Zhou Enlai coined the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence during negotiations between China and India in 1954.
 1  The purpose of the Five Princi-
ples policy was to ensure that the newly independent countries would avoid the aggressive relation-
ship they earlier experienced with colonial powers.
2
In Zhou Enlai’s 1964 outlining of China’s eight principles on aid to foreign countries, he 
stated that “the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and 
never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.” (Bräutigam, 2009: 29). Beijing has since 
consistently maintained that it does not impose political conditions to its lending and aid. For ex-
 China’s current leadership still rhetorically 
sticks to the principle of non-interference in foreign policy, but often couches it in a context of mu-
tually beneficial cooperation or common development. Illustrative of this is former Chinese Foreign 
Minister Li Zhaoxing’s statement that “mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs between countries are the necessary conditions for building a harmonious world.” (China 
Daily, 2007). Apart from obtaining United Nation’s Security Council authorisation for any crisis 
management action, China’s government regards host nation consent as a major distinguishing line 
that divides extensive Chinese involvement in Africa, for example, from Western intervention dur-
ing the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Van Hoeymissen, 2009). The Chinese 
government is thus able to claim that it does not intervene in other countries’ sovereign affairs. 
                                                 
1 The Five Principles are 1) mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (互相尊重主权和领土完整); 
2) mutual non-aggression (互不侵犯); 3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (互不干涉内政); 4) equal-
ity and mutual benefit (平等互利); and 5) peaceful co-existence (和平共处). 
2 The principle of non-interference is alluded to in Article 2, parts (4) and (7), of the first chapter of the Charter of the 
United Nations. While not explicitly stated, non-interference is also implicit in many provisions and a well-established 
guiding rule of international conduct (Chatham House, 2007). Since its suggestion in 2001, a lively debate has gone on 
within the UN system on modifying the non-interference principle to include “responsibility to protect” (see e.g. ICISS, 
2001). Mikael Mattlin and Matti Nojonen 
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ample, at the closing ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation Ministerial Conference 
in October 2000, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji said “China never attaches any political string to its 
assistance to Africa or seeks any political privilege in doing so.” (PRC Foreign Ministry, 2000). 
Wary of foreign criticism of China’s tying financial aid to securing access to natural resources, the 
Chinese State Council recently released its first-ever White Paper on Chinese foreign aid. The 
White Paper stresses that China does not attach any political conditionalities whatsoever to its for-
eign assistance, nor does it interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries or seek political privi-
leges (中华人民共和国国务院, 2011: 2–3). 
In this paper, we challenge the view cherished in China and widely accepted internation-
ally that Chinese bilateral lending is devoid of conditionality. We ask whether this “no-strings-
attached” perception stems from a limited view of conditionality encompassing only the kinds of 
conditions attached by the IMF and World Bank that  misses the conditionality inherent to Chinese 
lending. Our argument is that the assumption of China not attaching policy conditions in its lending 
is valid only in a narrow sense, understood as demanding adherence to certain governance and 
transparency standards or concrete changes to economic policy such as privatisation. In the broad 
sense, China is certainly not above attaching conditions to lending. However, most conditions are 
probably not imposed by a unitary state actor. They instead emerge from the voluminous business 
activities of Chinese state-linked lenders and enterprises in developing countries. 
 
 
2    Data sources and caveats 
 
Researching Chinese bilateral lending is fraught with data challenges. Comprehensive information 
on all bilateral loan frameworks and detailed numerical data related to policy-based lending are not 
publicly available. Specific loan covenants are confidential and the lending institutions in question 
are not particularly transparent or accessible. Unsurprisingly, relatively little is known about the 
terms of Chinese concessional loans (Foster et al., 2008: 40-44; Hubbard, 2007: 8-9). 
In 2008, a team of World Bank economists attempted one of the most thorough quantifica-
tions of Chinese-financed projects. They meticulously compiled a database of Chinese-financed in-
frastructure projects in Africa covering the years 2001–2007, sifting through international and Chi-
nese media reports, as well as Chinese official sources. Yet, even this studious attempt at quantify-
ing Chinese-financed projects reported that as many as 41 % of all projects were unverifiable; in-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/ 2011 
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formation on them was not available from any official Chinese sources (Foster et al., 2008: 12). 
This lack of comprehensive and solid data does not make the topic amenable to econometric analy-
sis, so we have adopted an eclectic approach to data-gathering, using data from multiple sources. 
First, we use information on loan deals available from publicly available Chinese sources 
(e.g. the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Commerce, and the contract database of the Bei-
jing University Faculty of Law). We also draw on scattered case-evidence and targeted anonymous 
interviews and discussions with people knowledgeable regarding various aspects of international 
lending. We have supplemented these sources with reviews of the Chinese policy debate, as well as 
drawn on secondary sources in the relevant literature. 
The paper gauges China’s position towards attaching explicit policy conditions to lending 
by first surveying the general debate on conditionality in policy-based lending and the Chinese do-
mestic debate on conditionality. For this purpose, we conducted an extensive review of the Chinese 
policy debate (academic journals, official statements, media columns, etc.) in the period 2007–
2010. We then turn to examine China’s bilateral lending practices, focusing on one of China’s three 
major state-owned “policy banks,” the China Exim Bank (Chexim). China’s two other policy banks 
are China Development Bank (CDB) and Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC). 
Based on the analysis, we hypothesise four kinds of conditionality related to Chinese bilat-
eral lending: political conditionality, embedded conditionality, cross-conditionality and emergent 
conditionality. A caveat regarding the empirical validity of these conditionality types needs to be 
mentioned here: our claims should be regarded only as tentative, suggesting perhaps the way for-
ward for further empirical study. The first two of the conditionality forms we identify are relatively 
well grounded empirically and based on the general features of Chinese bilateral lending and inter-
governmental agreements. The latter two, in contrast, are constructs arising mainly from scattered 
case-evidence, as well as our understandings of the nature and features of Chinese policy-based fi-
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3  The debate on conditionality in policy-based lending 
 
Attaching policy conditions to lending is by no means a new phenomenon. In the scholarly debate, 
especially the policy conditions attached by lending institutions of the World Bank Group have long 
been noted. 3 However, conditionality in policy-based lending subsequently also spread to regional 
development banks and bilateral donors (Koeberle et al., 2005: 5). In conjunction with IMF aid re-
quests in the 1980s, the IMF typically demanded “structural reforms” as a condition for receiving 
financial aid.4
The IMF and the World Bank shy away from the overtly political conditions related to 
“democracy” or “human rights” individual countries may apply in their development lending. In 
fact, the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank’s lending institutions prohibit them from inter-
fering in a country’s political affairs and making decisions based on the political character of the 
member country (see e.g. IBRD, 1989, Art. IV, section 10). Similar restrictions apply to the IMF 
(Bräutigam, 2010: 16, 44). In the self-understanding of these institutions, they have a non-political 
mandate, in comparison to “political” institutions such as the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, 
the World Bank institutions have occasionally been criticised for pursuing political objectives 
(Swedberg 1986: 386; Bacha, 1987; Teivainen, 1994: 19–24; Marquette, 2004). 
  
One critique of World Bank and IMF policy conditionality is that the development financ-
ing arms of these institutions place an unacceptably high number of detailed conditions on loan re-
cipients, who are often among the world’s poorest countries. One report counted on average 67 
conditions per World Bank loan (Eurodad report, 2006: 3). Many of these conditions promote pol-
icy goals that may be politically controversial such as the privatisation of basic services or trade lib-
eralisation. Most other bilateral and multilateral donors and creditors tie their development aid and 
debt relief to the existence of an IMF programme (ibid: 5), and international agencies may threaten 
to withdraw financial support if conditions are not met (Hunter and Brown, 2000: 117). The signifi-
cance of World Bank and IMF conditionality then goes beyond the funding provided by these insti-
tutions themselves. 
A different strand of conditionality critique concerns the ineffectiveness of lending condi-
tionality pursued by the World Bank Group institutions (e.g. Hunter and Brown, 2000; Weyland, 
                                                 
3 The World Bank’s International Development Assistance (IDA) and the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(Eurodad report, 2006: 5). 
4 The IMF Executive Board determines the broad parameters of conditionality, with IMF staff taking care of the details 
of particular stabilisation and adjustment programmes. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/ 2011 
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2003; Kaufman and Nelson, 2004). Financial aid affects policy reforms in complex ways, providing 
ample space for recipient governments to resist external pressures. Conditionality is often most ef-
fective when it coincides with domestic policy priorities and development needs (Wigell, 2011; 
Pridham, 2010). This line of critique has been prominent among IMF and World Bank economists, 
with much of the conditionality discussion in recent years revolving around the concept of  “country 
ownership” (see e.g. Koeberle et al., 2005). 
IMF conditionality also arose in 2000 as an issue in the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of 
swap arrangements between the central banks of Asean+3 countries (which includes China). Under 
the CMI, swap agreements are generally complementary to IMF assistance, although tying liquidity 
to the existence of an IMF programme and its conditionality requirements has been a perennial is-
sue. The bilateral swap agreement set up between China and Japan in 2002 was exceptional in that 
it did not include the IMF link and used local currencies (Chin, 2010: 703; Henning, 2002: 19-20; 
Ranjan and Prakash, 2010: 12). 
Chinese views on conditionality have to be understood against a backdrop of a highly criti-
cal domestic policy debate revolving around American dominance of the World Bank Group insti-
tutions and the US dollar’s dominance in the global economy. In keeping with this general mood, 
Chinese leaders are among the most vociferous critics of the current system of international eco-
nomic governance. In March 2009, for example, Chinese central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan 
argued in three articles (周, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c) that the world should gradually move away from 
dollar-centricity and pondered options that included more extensive use of IMF Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs). 
An often noted distinguishing feature of China’s foreign policy is its strong emphasis on 
principles (Zhang, 2008: 161). The policy conditionality of IMF and the World Bank seemingly 
clashes directly with the non-interference principle that supposedly guides much of China’s foreign 
policy. The Chinese government has recently toned down its insistence on absolute non-
interference, e.g. expressing concern over the stituation in Sudan (e.g. Evans and Steinberg, 2007; 
谢, 2010: 43) and shown a willingness to speak up when Chinese interests abroad are threatened. In 
February 2011, China surprised many by voting for a UN Security Council resolution on Libya 
(1970) that referred the situation to the International Criminal Court, a move that by some observers 
was interpreted as indicating a subtle change towards less intransigence on non-interference. Mikael Mattlin and Matti Nojonen 
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Nevertheless, in the domestic policy debate within China, the policy conditionality de-
mands of multilateral organisations are frequently criticised.
5
Many Chinese commentators argue that conditions imposed by the IMF such as forced 
free-floats of currencies, liberalisation of the capital account, privatisation and other, sometimes 
draconian, economic measures hurt more than help. In this debate, IMF conditionality is often seen 
as closely connected to the policy prescriptions favoured by the United States. Yu Yongding, an 
influential Chinese economist and former advisor to the Chinese central bank, bluntly states: “IMF 
conditionality should be totally reconsidered. The action taken by the US government in dealing 
with [sic] current financial crisis has totally discredited the prescriptions provided to and imposed 
on the crisis-affected countries during the Asian Financial Crisis.” (Yu, 2009: 3-4). 
 They are seen as a means of interfer-
ence in other countries’ domestic affairs. During the Asian financial crisis 1997–1998, condition-
ality came to be seen as a key part of the “Washington Consensus,” a term originally used to de-
scribe a set of policy recommendations imposed on Latin American countries’ economic, fiscal and 
financial policies in the 1980s (see Williamson, 1990 and 2004). More than a decade after the Asian 
financial crisis, the policy prescriptions and reforms required by the IMF are still commonly re-
garded among Chinese experts as having failed to achieve their objectives and fit badly with East 
Asian societies, while causing considerable economic and social pain (e.g. 中国评论新闻网, 2009a). 
Even as Chinese policy commentators have been critical in particular of the IMF condi-
tionality, Chinese experts have gained influential positions in the institutions of the World Bank 
Goup, and following recent voting reforms, China has emerged as one of the biggest shareholders in 
the IMF and World Bank. The policy criticism of external commentators has not been reflected in 
China’s actions within these organisations, where China has generally maintained a constructive 
role. Some people participating in the Chinese policy debate link the issues of China’s increasing 
IMF voting power and conditionality. For example, one Chinese professor based in Shanghai argues 
that, once China’s voting power becomes commensurate to the size of its economy, China can have 
a say in which countries can take money, how much they can take money and how they can use the 
money. Previously, it has been the United States that has used various aid packages to open up 
countries’ financial markets for US companies. Naturally, notes the professor, China can also later 
consider diplomatic, political and other reasons in promoting conditions for aid that are beneficial 
for China (中国评论新闻网, 2009b). 
                                                 
5 This claim is based on an extensive review by the authors of China’s policy debate on reforming the global financial 
system. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/ 2011 
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While occasionally flirting with the idea of China attaching its own conditions, Chinese 
commentators more commonly appear content with criticising the policy conditions attached by 
“Western-dominated” lending institutions and donors. Two Chinese experts even argue that foreign 
aid is never unconditional; it always furthers the commercial or political aims of the donor country. 
Astonishingly they then, practically in the same breath, maintain that China does not attach any po-
litical conditions to its development aid (see. e.g. 刁 and  何, 2008: 123-126). Another prominent 
Chinese scholar has argued that the Chinese practice of providing aid primarily in the form of turn-
key projects that require intensive Chinese involvement at all project phases, including post-
construction management during handover, does not constitute interference in the recipient coun-
tries domestic affairs; it merely teaches recipient countries to become self-reliant (周, 2008: 39). 
However, another Chinese commentator recently acknowledged that no country can entirely im-
plement a policy of non-interference in other countries domestic politics (谢, 2010: 43). 
 
 
4  The scope and nature of Chinese bilateral lending 
 
China has emerged as a major bilateral lender to developing countries in recent years. Chinese lead-
ers frequently promise concessional loans amounting to billions of US dollars. For example, in 
2005 both the Chinese president and foreign minister pledged US$10 billion in concessional loans 
to developing countries over the following three years. Two years later, the chairman of the Na-
tional People’s Congress promised $5 billion in preferential loans to African countries. In 2009, 
Chinese premier Wen Jiabao pledged a further $10 billion in concessional loans to African coun-
tries, plus an additional $1 billion loan for small and medium-sized African businesses. Although 
the realised concessional loan sums are often much less than what is stated in the media (Bräutigam, 
2010: 19), they are, nonetheless, significant. 
Most of China’s development lending is done by the Chexim and CDB. Administratively, 
Chexim is directly under the Chinese State Council. CDB is more focused on investments and is 
owned by Central Huijin Investment, which, in turn, is owned by China Investment Corporation. 
CIC sits administratively under the Ministry of Finance (Walter and Howie, 2011: 218). Given that 
Chexim is the sole government-authorized source of concessional loans and export credits in Mikael Mattlin and Matti Nojonen 
 








 and that it incorporates a role that in many other countries is handled by designated bilateral 
donor institutions (Foster et al., 2008: 40-41), growth in the balance sheet of Chexim provides a 
proxy for China’s growing bilateral development lending. From a modest beginning in the mid-
1990s, Chexim’s balance sheet has recently outpaced the balance sheet assets of the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (see Figure 1). The compound annual growth rate for the bank’s balance sheet has 
been a staggering 47.0 % over the course of its existence, and a still-respectable 27.7 % in the dec-
ade to 2009, with the last two years showing a clear jump in balance sheet assets.  
Figure 1    China Exim Bank’s total assets on balance sheet compared with the Asian Development 
  Bank’s assets 1997–2009 (US$ billion) 
 
 
Sources: China Exim Bank annual report 2009, Asian Development Bank annual reports 1998–2009. 
Note: Values in Chinese yuan have been converted to US$ using year-end currency rates. 
   
 
Analysis by the Financial Times recently estimated that CDB and Chexim lent at least US$100 bil-
lion to developing countries during 2009–2010, topping the loans provided by the World Bank’s 
main lending arm, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Interna-
tional Financial Corporation, the main private-sector lending vehicle of the World Bank Group for 
non-sovereign-backed lending (Financial Times, 2011). In some cases, developing countries have 
apparently chosen to take Chinese bilateral funding in lieu of a funding package negotiated with the 
IMF or the World Bank (Chin and Helleiner, 2008: 90). 
                                                 
6 The Foreign Ministry chooses priority countries and the Ministry of Commerce is mainly responsible for direct aid. 
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The April 2011 White Paper on Chinese foreign aid notes that as of end-2009 China had 
provided a total of 256.3 billion yuan in foreign aid (about US$40 billion at current exchange rates), 
of which 58.6 % was provided in the form of concessional or interest-free loans (中华人民共和国国务
院, 2011: 3). Although the report did not break down sums by country, this was apparently the first 
time the Chinese government had ever released overall figures for foreign aid. The large discrep-
ancy between the figures of White Paper and the Financial Times appears to stem from the fact that 
only budgetary transfers were counted in the official aid figure, which includes interest on conces-
sional loans but not principal (周, 2008: 40). 
Chinese definitions and practices related to its fast-growing bilateral financing are some-
what vague; they do not follow standard conventions or the definitions used by the OECD and in 
other multilateral arrangements. China also frequently invokes the catch-all term “external assis-
tance” (对外援助), a broad concept that embraces grants, interest-free loans, preferential loans, coop-
erative and joint venture funds for aid projects, science and technology cooperation and medical 
assistance (Schüller et al., 2010: 2-3; 中华人民共和国国务院, 2011). Unlike direct aid and interest-free 
loans funded by budgetary means, concessional loans and preferential buyer credits provided by 
Chexim are funded by issuing debt on the financial markets. Only the interest differential on con-
cessional loans is paid from the aid budget of the Ministry of Commerce; the difference between the 
interest on preferential buyer’s credits and Chexim’s funding costs are covered by the Ministry of 
Finance (刁 and 何, 2008: 132-133). 
Much of the debate about Chinese foreign aid practices relates to this ambiguity in what 
constitues proper development aid, what is to be considered pure export promotion, and what, per-
haps, should even be regarded as foreign direct investment. Adding to the confusion, Chinese con-
cessional loans are often bundled with market-rate loans. A fairly typical feature of Chinese bilat-
eral lending is the financing package. Pioneered by Chexim in 2006, the package combines conces-
sional loans with export buyer and export seller credits (Bräutigam, 2010: 38). These packages have 
been compared to OECD “mixed credits” (ibid: 20), but the Chinese financing packages may be 
more relaxed on environmental and anti-bribery requirements (OECD countries customarily set en-
vironmental and anti-bribery requirements on the projects they support with official development Mikael Mattlin and Matti Nojonen 
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assistance). Furthermore, Chinese financing packages do not need to be reported to other countries, 
so they evade external review.
7
The emergence of the Chinese policy banks as major players on the international develop-
ment lending scene has had a significant impact on efforts to erect and maintain common standards 
and practices in bilateral development lending. China has taken an ambivalent attitude towards ef-
forts at setting lending standards coordinated under the auspices of the OECD. According to the 
agreement among OECD members concessional loans can be offered with longer repayment terms 
and lower interest rates than might otherwise be offered by the market. China observes the OECD 
work undertaken on officially supported export credits and tied-aid credits, but does not endorse 
OECD guidelines on lending that take the form of “gentleman’s agreements” (OECD, 2010).
 
8 
China, however, frequently uses the term “concessional” to denote loans it provides to developing 
countries. As a result, there has been substantial debate over how “concessional” Chinese conces-
sional loans are in practice. The case-evidence (Bräutigam, 2010: 22-23), and the terms of publicly 
available concessional loan framework agreements suggest Chinese concessional loans are not par-
ticularly concessional when it comes to maturities or interest rates.
9
Foster et al. applied the standardised calculation formula used by the World Bank’s Inter-
national Development Association to assess the grant element of Chinese concessional loans to 
Sub-Saharan Africa during the period 2002–2006. On average, these loans had a grant element of 
36 %, which was well above the 25 % threshold used by the World Bank and the IMF as an official 
development assistance (ODA) definition, but far below the 60 % grant element of IDA credits. On 
average, the assessed Chinese loans offered an interest rate of 3.6 %, a grace period of four years 
and a maturity of twelve years. There is, however, much variation in the financing terms of Chinese 
financing institutions, depending on the recipient country. Overall, the assessed Chinese conces-
sional loans offered a moderate level of concessionality which was well above private creditors but 
lower than other official creditors (Foster et al., 2008: 46-47). 
 
In providing a concessional loan, a framework agreement is first drawn up between the 
governments of China and the recipient country. No complete set of concluded agreements is pub-
lished, and even the details of the reported framework agreements are often sketchy. As a result, 
                                                 
7 Anonymous interview with two persons involved in development lending; April 1, 2011. 
8 Anonymous interview with two persons involved in development lending; February 3, 2011. 
9 The authors surveyed six agreements made with Turkmenistan, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zambia, Venezuela and Tonga in 
the period 2001–2003. Beijing University Faculty of Law database. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/ 2011 
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compiling an exhaustive list of such agreements is challenging. Appendix 1 shows framework 
agreements that can be found by searching on the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Commerce Minis-
try websites and the contract database of the Beijing University Faculty of Law. We further sup-
plement our list with agreements identified in an earlier study that relied on the Foreign Ministry 
website. Through these sources, we identify 90 framework agreements signed with 50 different 
countries. Obviously, these represent a fraction of all agreements. Chexim itself refers to having 
signed 78 concessional loan projects in the period 2001–2005 alone (Foster et al., 2008: 40-41). 
Probably the most comprehensive assessment, the recent State Council White Paper on Chinese aid, 
claims 325 concessional-loan-financed projects in 76 countries (中华人民共和国国务院, 2011: 4). 
Concessional loans are always denominated in yuan, while preferential export credits are 
denominated in other currencies. In practice, however, Chinese development lending almost never 
involves direct transfers of money to the target country through loans and only rarely takes the form 
of cash grants (Foster et al., 2008: 43; Bräutigam, 2010: 19). When a Chinese policy bank makes a 
concessional loan, the money typically never leaves China. Chexim, for instance, pays the Chinese 
contractors or suppliers in yuan and the recipient pays off in dollar installments to Chexim. One 
condition for such a loan is that the project has a Chinese lead contractor so that the loan can be 
transferred directly from the lender’s account to the lead contractor’s account in a Chinese bank. 
The borrower then repays in installments to the Chinese policy bank in an agreed currency or form. 
The practice is common in bilateral development lending and export credit financing in general. 
This lending practice forms a natural springboard for increasing international use of the 
yuan. In December 2010, Chexim announced that in the coming five years it would use its position 
to promote internationalisation of the yuan in cross-border trade and investment (China Radio In-
ternational, 2010). This is in line with the policy objectives of the Chinese government. The re-
cently released 12
th five-year plan endorses gradual increase of the yuan in international trade and 
promoting its greater international use (中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划的建议, 
2010: 28, 30). China’s central bank has also announced measures to this effect. Earlier, China has 
already concluded a number of bilateral swap agreements using the yuan (see Appendix 2). Requir-
ing the use of the Chinese currency in bilateral lending and how the Chinese policy banks will put 
the policy objectives of the 12
th five-year plan into practice are evolving issues. 
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5    Lending with Chinese conditions 
 
Below we describe and explain the four types of conditionality we have identified by examining 
specific cases and the general literature on Chinese lending. 
 
Political conditionality. Political conditionality refers to the recipient country needing to meet basic 
diplomatic and political preconditions prior to receiving any funding. These include diplomatic rela-
tions and toeing the line on Chinese political sensitivities. This political conditionality inherent in 
Chinese diplomatic dealings is akin to the political conditionality applied by the European Union. 
The EU routinely demands the inclusion of a “democracy and human rights clause” when signing 
partnership agreements with non-EU governments. 
While the policy conditionality of international financing institutions is often criticised in 
the Chinese debate and Chinese foreign policy supposedly is guided by the non-interference princi-
ple, Beijing itself has often attached broad political conditions for reaching diplomatic agreements 
(Zhang, 2008: 162). Most obviously, Beijing regularly demands that its interlocutors reaffirm their 
commitment to the One-China principle and the People’s Republic of China’s as the legitimate gov-
ernment of China, before cooperation can ensue. 
Chinese state-owned lenders contend they do not apply political conditionality to their 
lending, even advertising this to non-Chinese customers as a key advantage of taking a Chinese loan 
(China Exim Bank, 2007). If we do not accept this statement at face value, we may ask what politi-
cal conditions are applied in Chinese development lending? The diplomatic precondition is the first 
hurdle. In Chinese lending to developing countries, diplomatic relations with the PRC are a stated 
condition for receiving e.g. a Chexim concessional loan (China Exim Bank, 2009). Indeed, all the 
African countries to which Chinese policy banks have lent money have diplomatic relations with 
the PRC (with the exception of  Swaziland). As a rule then, Chinese aid and bank credits are given 
to countries with which China has diplomatic ties (Bräutigam, 2010: 7, 29-30). This has larger trade 
implications as China is known to have asked its trading partners to support the diplomatic isolation 
of Taiwan (Farnsworth, 2011: 56), and has restricted and punished countries that do not obey Bei-
jing’s wishes to isolate Taiwan from multilateral international organisations and venues where 
membership or attendance is based on sovereignty. As an example, Beijing pressured Hanoi to ex-
clude Taiwan from the APEC summit in Vietnam in 2006. When Hanoi refused, Beijing temporar-
ily halted aid to Vietnam (Mitton, 2006). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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The political condition of adhering to the One-China policy may be enshrined in diplo-
matic agreements that incorporate the framework agreement for concessional loans. For example, 
China and Belarus signed a joint communiqué in 2007 after a meeting during which a framework 
agreement for the first Chinese concessional loan to Belarus was signed. The joint communiqué 
contains pledges by Belarus to adhere to a One-China policy; reaffirm the PRC as the legitimate 
government of all of China; resist Taiwanese independence, including all kinds of measures aimed 
at legitimising Taiwanese independence such as referenda on Taiwan’s re-joining the UN; resisting 
Taiwan’s participation in all international and regional organisations where membership is reserved 
for sovereign countries; and promising not to engage in any interaction with Taiwan of an official 
nature. Belarus also expressed its support for PRC efforts to reunify with Taiwan and stated that the 
Taiwan issue is a Chinese domestic matter. On Tibet, Belarus stated that it is an inseparable part of 
China and firmly resisted attempts by any country to interfere in China’s domestic matters. In re-
turn, China pledged its opposition to any efforts to use “human rights” to interfere in the internal 
matters of Belarus (中华人民共和国政府和白俄罗斯共和国政府联合公报, 2007). 
Some scholars argue that China’s conditionality when it comes to aid is almost entirely 
political; requiring recipient countries to support China’s positions on various global issues 
(Bergsten, 2008). There is relative certainty regarding the fact that the positions on human rights 
and global governance issues of China and other developing countries are increasingly aligned 
(Holslag, 2010: 8). A harder-to-answer question is whether receiving ample Chinese funding and 
endorsing such general political statements commonly incorporated into bilateral communiqués and 
agreements actually results in other countries aligning their political positions with China or 
complying with China’s wishes. Some even argue that it is China which is aligning its position with 
developing countries (Bräutigam, 2010: 38). 
An interesting case of how Chinese financing may have political consequences is  the 
December 2009 visit of Chinese vice-president Xi Jinping to Cambodia, where he announced 
US$1.2 billion in aid and loans. Only one day before his visit, Cambodian authorities forcibly 
deported 20 Uighur asylum-seekers to China. Before the repatriation, the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights had expressed concern to the Cambodian government regarding deportations to 
China. China and Cambodia are both signatories to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of 
Refugees. The Convention obligates parties to cooperate with the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (USCC, 2010: 122). 
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Embedded conditionality. Embedded conditionality refers to the recipient country needing to ad-
here to a number or project-related demands regarding, for example, the use of Chinese-sourced 
contractors, sub-contractors, technology, equipment suppliers, management and training, as well as 
a Chinese workforce. Scholars have long identified the purchase of donor country exports, or “cap-
tive demand,” as a condition of foreign aid (Richardson, 1978: 56). Chinese experts also recognise 
that making aid conditional on the purchase of donor country products and technologies is one of 
the main economic aims of foreign aid (刁 and 何, 2008: 123–124). 
  Whereas the proportion of untied aid of all bilateral aid has risen to 82 % for Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries (Clay et al., 2009: 12), Chinese external assistance 
still consists entirely of “tied aid” (Chin and Frolic, 2007: 11, 14). Tied aid refers to an international 
practice whereby the borrower is tied to purchase the required technology or equipment from the 
lender country. In a tied-aid arrangement, the loan interest rate is low and eligibility is limited, ac-
cording to OECD rules regulating ODA, to low- and lower-middle-income countries. As men-
tioned, China is not a party to the OECD agreement, so it does not adhere to this convention. Natu-
rally, China also does not need to report its ODA to those countries that are party to the OECD 
agreement.
10
  China provides concessional loans to upper-middle-income countries for which ODA nor-
mally is not an important part of the national economy. China’s White Paper on aid mentions that 
11 % of Chinese foreign assistance has gone to upper-middle income countries (中华人民共和国国务
院, 2011: 9). In Table 1, we have extracted those concessional loan framework agreements from 
Appendix 1 that China has concluded with upper-middle-income countries. China also directs some 
of its foreign aid, especially concessional loans, into economically viable sectors, such as telecom-
munications, mining, and other industrial projects (周, 2008: 40), i.e.  activities forbidden to parties 
to the OECD agreement. According to the guidelines agreed within the OECD, countries can only 








                                                 
10 There are two committees in OECD that deal with aid: the Export Credit Committee is responsible for tied aid and the 
Development Aid Committee for untied aid. 
11 Anonymous interview with two persons involved in development lending; April 1, 2011. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Table 1    Select upper-middle income countries with which China has concluded concessional  






















  Note: Upper middle income countries are based on the 2009 OECD DAC 
  list of ODA recipient countries: <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/40/43540882.pdf>. 
  Sources: World Bank and OECD. 
 
It seems that concessional loans and preferential buyer’s export credits have become central com-
ponents in financing Chinese business operations abroad. According to the Chexim, such loans are 
directed into manufacturing projects, infrastructure construction projects and social welfare projects 
in the borrowing country that will generate promising economic returns or good social benefits 
(China Exim Bank, 2009). In a typical case of Chinese policy bank financing, Chexim provides a 
loan denominated in the Chinese currency for a recipient company, local or central government. A 
central condition to qualify for the loan is that the recipient uses a Chinese contractor in engineer-
ing, procurement and construction (EPC) phases, as well as import essential technologies and 
equipment from China and allow the contractor and subcontractors to use a Chinese workforce 
(Bräutigam, 2010: 29-30). In many cases, this model excludes local businesses and restricts utilisa-
tion of local labour. In October 2010, a member of the Vietnamese National Assembly’s Finance 
and Budget Committee claimed that 30 Chinese companies were participating in 42 key strategic 
projects in Vietnam. Apparently, the Chinese contractors used no Vietnamese materials, equipment 
or labour (VietNamNet, 2010). The White Paper notes that the most important form of Chinese for-
eign assistance is the provision of complete projects (成套项目). Such turnkey projects currently ac-
Country  Net ODA 
(as % of GNI) 
Antigua and Barbados  0.96 % 
Belarus  0.19 % 
Botswana  1.14 % 
Dominica  7.85 % 
Fiji  1.84 % 
Jamaica  0.38 % 
Mauritius  0.51 % 
Seychelles  1.69 % 
Suriname  2.94 % 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.00 % 
Venezuela  0.05 % Mikael Mattlin and Matti Nojonen 
 




  20 
count for about 40 % of all Chinese budgetary expenditure on foreign assistance (中华人民共和国国
务院, 2011: 5; see also 周, 2008: 39). 
Repayment of the loan is sometimes backed with proceeds from the recipient country’s 
main export commodity. The proceeds are either put in an escrow account with Chexim (e.g. Ghana 
uses cocoa revenues to pay for a Chinese loan for the Bui Dam), or the resource itself can be ac-
cepted as payment as in the case of Angolan oil. A number of African countries have used such re-
source-backed credit lines: Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, D.R. Congo, 
Sudan, Angola and Gabon and possibly Zimbabwe. This model is sometimes referred to as “Angola 
mode.” In the Angolan case, Chexim has provided Angola since 2002 with several billion dollars in 
loans, building a vast number of infrastructure projects.
12
Apart from the few political conditions described above, Chinese policy-based lenders do 
not demand explicit policy conditions up-front like many other lenders. This facilitates the speed 
with which Chinese loans can be granted  − a crucial competitive advantage in export financing. On 
the other hand, it stands clear that on a project level, Chinese sovereign-backed financing com-
monly comes with a number of conditions attached. This is not unusual per se as, for example, tied 
aid of other countries includes similar provisions. However, Chinese requirements regarding use of 
Chinese inputs (labour, contractors, etc.) appear to be generally higher than in most cases. What 
makes Chinese financing somewhat more sui generis is the fact that, unlike most bilateral lenders, 
all Chinese policy-based financing follows the tied-aid model, including financing for higher in-
come countries. Conditionality here does not refer to demands for outright changes of a country’s 
economic policy, rather conditionality is embedded in the project financing requirements. 
 According to the agreements, the money 
could only be used for infrastructure building and 70 % of the projects would be awarded to Chi-
nese state-owned enterprises approved by the Chinese government that brought over their own la-
bour from China. Loan repayments are made in oil, making Angola the largest source of crude oil 
imports for China (Foster et al., 2008: 20-21, 42-43; Bräutigam, 2010: 20-21; Michel and Beuret, 
2009: 214-215). The large role played by state-owned enterprises in implementing Chinese devel-
opment projects has been noted even by Chinese scholars as a peculiar feature of Chinese foreign 
aid (刁 and 何, 2008: 132). 
 
                                                 
12 A private company called China International Fund, established into Hong Kong in 2003, also has major investment 
commitments in sub-Saharan Africa, especially Angola. The ownership and source of its capital are unclear. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Cross-conditionality. In the literature, cross-conditionality (sometimes referred to as implicit condi-
tionality) indicates a situation where the conditions established by other creditors may de facto be-
come conditions for loan disbursement of a new creditor (IMF, 2002: 40; Koeberle, 2005: 11). In 
the Chinese case, we contend that cross-conditionality refers to a situation whereby using funding 
provided by Chinese policy banks provides a lever to demand actions from the recipient country in 
some other context before loan disbursement. 
An apparent case of cross-conditionality occurred in Indonesia, where China agreed to fi-
nance most of the estimated US$8 billion budget for construction of a dozen coal-fired power plants 
with a total capacity of 10,000 MW to be operated by Indonesian state-owned electricity company 
PLN. The financing was provided by Chexim, CDB and Bank of China. In January 2009, after pro-
viding an initial $2 billion loan tranche, the Chinese financiers suddenly suspended the release of 
further disbursements to all power plant projects. Separately, the CDB also pulled out of financing 
another power project in South Sulawesi Province, leading to the project’s postponement. Accord-
ing to Indonesian sources, the Chinese financiers provided different explanations for their actions; 
they were either demanding higher interest rates than agreed in the original contract, or arguing, as 
the CDB, that they were “having problems” financing the project (PSIREN, 2009; Jakarta Globe, 
2009a; 2009b). 
In February 2009, Indonesian officials were informed that their Chinese investors were 
demanding the Indonesian government settle a contentious commercial dispute involving a much 
smaller deal between Indonesian PT Merpati Nusantara Airline and Xi’an Aircraft Industry, which 
had been financed with a $232 million Chexim concessional loan. The Merpati dispute began when 
the company aborted its purchase of 15 civilian aircraft from the Chinese manufacturer after run-
ning into money problems. The Indonesians were told that the Chinese are willing to release the 
disbursements of power plant financing as soon as the Merpati dispute was settled. It is notable that 
the original financing for the Merpati deal was provided by Chexim, but the CDB and the Bank of 
China joined Chexim in an orchestrated suspension of  all financing of power-plant projects in In-
donesia. Suspending of financing for the power plants undermined the Indonesian government’s 
political credentials; the government had promised to implement fast-track the construction of 
much-needed electricity capacity and was relying on Chinese financing to meet that goal. Suspen-
sion of Chinese financing threatened to dump the massive power construction project on Indonesian 
banks (Jakarta Globe, 2009c; Jakarta Post, 2009a; 2009b). 
According to the Indonesian Minister of Energy, the situation had put them in a “hostage 
situation” that could only be solved if the Indonesian government caved to Chinese demands to first Mikael Mattlin and Matti Nojonen 
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settle the Merpati dispute. The Chinese financiers also demanded higher interest rates in the PLN 
loans than originally agreed. In response, the Indonesian government sent a high-level delegation, 
led by its ministers for finance and trade, to China to seek clarification regarding Beijing’s inten-
tions and to de-link the disputed aicraft deal from power-plant financing. The dispute was eventu-
ally resolved after the ministers’ trip. The Indonesian Finance Minister later requested that Chinese 
yuan, instead of US dollars, would be used for the procurement of project facilities from China 
(PSIREN, 2009; Jakarta Post, 2009a; 2009b; Jakarta Globe, 2009b). 
Caution needs to be exercised in generalising on this case and the possible linkages be-
tween separate financing deals as the information is based on second-hand sources. Nevertheless, 
the case suggests that large-scale Chinese financing in developing countries can confer leverage on 
Chinese state-linked financial institutions that extends across projects in the same recipient country. 
 
Emergent conditionality. Emergent conditionality refers to the structural effects a history of Chi-
nese funding and investment might create in the future. We stress that the existence of such condi-
tionality is merely hypothetical as we have yet to see solid empirical validation. 
  Major infrastructure projects (e.g. power plants, railway networks, telecom networks) 
funded by Chinese policy banks usually involve transfer of complex technology, hardware, software 
and managerial know-how from China. The large size of these projects and high concentration of 
sourcing and management in Chinese hands at all stages of the project (design, construction, instal-
lation, testing, training, and post-construction management) create technological, financial, manage-
rial and educational dependencies that over time could create political dependency between the host 
country and China (周, 2008: 39). We are referring here to a situation where the recipient country’s 
manoeuvrability is restricted by the accumulated weight of the “sunken costs” of relying exten-
sively on China for critical aspects of major infrastructure projects. 
  While Chinese lending and investments are distributed around the globe, many of China’s 
largest financial and infrastructure commitments are concentrated in a few countries. In sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, 70 % of Chinese financing commitments during 2001–2007 went to 
Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia and Sudan (with Nigeria  and Angola accounting for more than half of 
the total) (Foster et al., 2008: 19–20). In Asia, major Chinese commitments are similarly concen-
trated in certain countries. By some accounts, Chinese contractors have attained approximately a 
90 % share of the EPC projects in Vietnam (VBN, 2010). They are also the general contractors or 
retain key roles in 80 % of the 40 coal-fired power plant projects in the country’s development plan. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Most of these projects are in strategic sectors such as oil, gas, power, chemicals and labour-
intensive textile industries. According to Nguyen Van Thu, chairman of the Vietnam Association of 
Mechanical Engineering, “Ten thermal power plants each with a capacity of 300MW are being built 
by Chinese contractors, because Vietnamese firms were denied a level playing field.” (VietNamNet, 
2010). Similar complaints have emerged recently in other recipient countries. Interestingly, one 
Chinese commentator suggests China needs to apply more conditions to its bilateral lending to quell 
the growing chorus of criticism (谢, 2010: 42-43). In any case, Chinese lending and investments to 
date have generally been positively received in developing countries with few projects inciting ma-
jor local resistance (see e.g. Parameswaran, 2010: 45). 
Chinese-funded investments in strategic sectors have handed Chinese state-owned banks 
and enterprises collectively a highly influential position, for example, in the Angolan and Vietnam-
ese economies. It can reasonably be argued that the Chinese policy banks, state-owned enterprises 
and state-owned commercial banks responsible for most functions in bilateral projects are not 
equivalent to the Chinese government. Nevertheless, the Chinese policy banks are state-owned 
lenders and strategic investors with stated goals of carrying out the policy objectives of the Chinese 
government. It may well be assumed that they, at the very least, are not indifferent to the state’s 
broader political objectives even if it means benign goals such as promoting strong commercial and 
political ties with host countries.  
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
This paper has tried to debunk the notion that Chinese bilateral lending is devoid of conditionality 
as is often claimed. We argued that the assumption that China shuns conditionality only holds when 
conditionality is narrowly understood as implying the policy conditions associated with the lending 
institutions of the World Bank Group. In this light, a good case could also be made for Western 
lending being much less conditional than is generally assumed (Bräutigam, 2011: 3). Reality often 
comes in shades of grey. The conditionality of China’s lending activities may simply take different 
forms from the ones that traditionally have been the subject of academic and policy discussion. 
Importantly, the conditionalities that we have identified are not imposed by the Chinese 
state as explicit policy conditions that require changes to national economic policies. While there 
are some broad demands regarding diplomatic relations and political bottom lines, much of the con-Mikael Mattlin and Matti Nojonen 
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ditionality seems to emerge as possibly unintended consequences of the plethora of activities that 
various Chinese state-linked lenders and enterprises engage in. There is an affinity in this idea to 
Ann-Marie Slaughter’s point of a disaggregated state  − the network logic of globalisation having 
transformed interactions from intergovernmental negotiations between sovereigns to direct interac-
tions between sectoral specialists (Slaughter, 2004: 12). 
Our argument here relates to a broader and highly topical issue: To what extent does China 
use its growing financial power to gain commercial or political leverage? Concern has recently been 
raised that China may use e.g. its promises of Southern European bond purchases to gain political 
and commercial advantages. In early 2008, the manager of China’s foreign currency reserves, 
SAFE, allegedly invested in Costa Rican government bonds as part of a bilateral agreement that 
called for Costa Rica to cut its ties with Taiwan and recognise the People’s Republic (Chin and 
Helleiner, 2008: 91). Recently, American diplomatic cables obtained by Wikileaks also alleged that 
China used its massive U.S. Treasury holdings to pressure U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geith-
ner to lean on Federal Reserve regulators and speed up approval of an investment by China Invest-
ment Corporation (Reuters, 2011). 
Many of these suspicions are undoubtedly overblown, stemming partly from a lack of 
transparency on the part of Chinese state-controlled investors and lending institutions. Nonetheless, 
the fact is that China’s role as a global financial power is rapidly growing at a time when we still 
have relatively little solid research on what kind of conditions, if any, Chinese lending institutions 
attach to their lending. 
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Appendix 1  Illustrative list of concessional loan framework agreements signed between  
    the Chinese government and other governments (partial). 
 
Recipient country  Signing year  Loan 
amounts (in 
RMB mn) 
Loan purpose (if mentioned) 
Antigua and Barbados  1998, 2008    Power transmission system, 30 MW electricity plant 
Azerbaijan  1998     
Bangladesh  2005, 2010     
Belarus  2007  550   
Benin  2006     
Botswana  1995, 1998, 
2004, 2005, 2006 
200 (2004)  Reconstructing railroads, building roads and constructing 
housing units 
Cambodia  2004     
Cameroon  2007    City water supply 
Cape Verde  2008     
Congo-Kinshasa  2006     
Dominica  2009    National University and National Guest House rebuilding 
and extension 
Egypt  2002, 2004, 2006     
Eritrea  2006, 2009  166; 61  Container surveillance system and construction of commu-
nications network 
Fiji  2006     
Ghana  2008     
Guyana  2004  270  Constructing power plant for sugar factory  
Jamaica  1998, 2004, 2006    Completing conference centre  
Kenya  2005, 2009    Geothermal well 
Laos  2002, 2004     
Lesotho  2007     
Maldives  2004     
Mali  1995, 2000, 2008     
Mauritius  2000, 2003, 2007    Waste water treatment  
Mongolia  2005     
Mozambique  2008    Grain machinery equipment; Chinese government help in 
constructing national stadium; countryside telecom coverage 
Namibia  2007    Container surveillance equipment; electronic document and 
file management system 
Niger  1998    Textile printing and colouring factory Mikael Mattlin and Matti Nojonen 
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Pakistan  2006, 2009  2484; 1350  Road repair, communications satellite 
Philippines  2006     
Samoa  2006, 2010     
Senegal  2009  225; 160  Upgrading national secure network and bus system  
Seychelles  2007, 2007    Constructing waste water disposal system, airplane purchas-
ing 
Sierra Leone  2006  133  Upgrading countryside telecom network 
Sri Lanka  2003     
Suriname  2004, 2008     
Syria  2004, 2008     
Tajikistan  1998, 2006     
Tanzania  2002  100   
Togo  2004, 2005, 2007    Enhancing mobile network capacity 
Tonga  2001, 2007  40 (2001)  Reconstructing central business district in the capital 
Trinidad and Tobago  2005, 2006, 2009  850  Aluminium smelter 
Tunisia  2004    Constructing hydropower plant 
Turkmenistan  1998, 2000, 
2003, 2004, 




Purchase of Chinese train wagons 
Uganda  2007, 2009    National data transmission backbone and e-government 
Ukraine  1998     
Uzbekistan  1999, 2000     
Venezuela  2001, 2005  150 (2001)   
Vietnam  2001, 2002, 2005  50 (2002)   
Yemen  2006     
Zambia  2001, 2006  40 (2001)   
 
Sources: PRC Foreign Ministry and PRC Commerce Ministry; Beijing University Law Info; Hubbard, 
2007: 16, and internet news sources. Searches performed on the Chinese language sites during Febru-
ary-June 2011. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/ 2011 
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Appendix 2   Bilateral swap agreements between China and other central banks. 
 
Year  counterparty  value in US$  using yuan 
2001  Thailand  2.0 bn   
2002  Japan  3.0 bn  yes 
2002  South Korea  2.0 bn  yes 
2002  Malaysia  2.0 bn   
2003  Philippines  1.0 bn   
2003  Indonesia  1.0 bn   
2005  Indonesia  2.0 bn   
2006  Indonesia  4.0 bn   
2008  South Korea  26.3 bn  yes 
2009  Hong Kong  29.3 bn  yes 
2009  Malaysia  11.7 bn  yes 
2009  Belarus  2.8 bn  yes 
2009  Indonesia  14.6 bn  yes 
2009  Argentina  10.2 bn  yes 
2010  Iceland  0.5 bn  yes 
2010  Singapore  22.0 bn  yes 
2011  New Zealand  3.8 bn  yes 
 
  Sources: Compiled from second-hand sources (Henning, 2002: 20; Lee, 2010: 28)  
  and the Internet. 
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